On the basis of recent theories of metacognition, the authors predicted that eyewitnesses would be accurate in then" confidence judgments for recall but not in their feeling-of-knowing (FOK) judgments. In 3 studies, participants were presented with crime scenarios on video and acted as witnesses. Participants attempted to answer cued-recall questions and either rated their recall confidence or predicted their subsequent ability to recognize unrecalled answers. FOK accuracy was determined using a final recognition test. Although confidence judgments were predictive, in all 3 experiments, FOK accuracy was at chance. The authors argued that the low FOK accuracy reflects the lack of effectiveness of the metacognitive heuristics used in eyewitness memory. Consequently, the authors predicted that in an applied setting, prediction of future recognition performance for unrecalled eyewitness material is likely to be at chance.
the car. The investigator asks whether she would recognize the car if she saw it again. She says that she is confident that she would.
There are two distinct metacognitive aspects to the witness' report in the above scenario. There is the confidence that she reports for the details she can recall, and there is the confidence she has that she will later recognize details she cannot currently recall. The former is a form of a retrospective confidence judgment, and the latter is more commonly known as feeling of knowing (FOK) . Although there has been considerable interest in eyewitness confidence judgments, to date, there has been little research on the accuracy of FOK in eyewitness memory. This is the main focus of the present research.
Within the cognitive literature, there is growing interest in the nature of FOK judgments made in the absence of recall (Hart, 1965; Koriat, 1993 Koriat, , 1994 Metcalfe, Schwartz, & Joaquim, 1993) . Clearly, this laboratory-based literature can offer some insight into metacognitive judgments in eyewitness memory. Two broad theoretical viewpoints have been advanced regarding the genesis of FOK judgments (for an earlier theoretical review, see Nelson, Gerler, & Narens, 1984) . One view, which can be referred to as the retrieval view, is that evaluation comes from accessing the memory trace itself. A version of this view was proposed originally by Hart in his seminal work on FOK judgments. The idea is that individuals have partial access to a trace that is temporarily inaccessible and that they can use this access to guide their estimate of future performance. Koriat has more recently argued that the FOK comes not from access of the target trace, because this is inaccessible, but is due to associated partial information that is generated during the retrieval process. Retrieval-based heuristics have also been invoked for the genesis of retrospective confidence judgments. Nelson and Narens (1990) and Kelley and Lindsay (1993) demonstrated that confidence in retrieved answers stems at least in part from the speed of retrieval of the item, regardless of the accuracy of the information. Because memories that are better known are more likely to be accurate, the speed-as-accuracy heuristic has some use. Thus, although these views differ in detail, they share the notion that metacognitive judgments stem from monitoring the output of the retrieval process.
A second line of research has stressed the role of the cue in metacognitive judgments not the role of the target. According to this view, it is not partial access to the trace that is used as a heuristic but the familiarity of the question terms. Two kinds of familiarity have been studied: familiarity with the particular terms in the question or cue (henceforth, cue-based familiarity) and familiarity with the domain of expertise under test (henceforth, expertise-based familiarity). Evidence for the former comes from studies such as that by Metcalfe et al. (1993) , who used a paired-associate design to independently manipulate the number of repetitions of cue and target. They found that FOK judgments were not related to target memorability but to cue familiarity. There is also evidence in support of expertisebased heuristics. Costermans, Lories, and Ansay (1992) found that the predictive power of FOK judgments was removed entirely by partialling out beliefs about what should be known. In contrast, the predictive power of retrospective confidence judgments following recall remained significant after controlling for beliefs about what should be known. Trafimow and Sniezek (1994) studied the impact of expertise on the accuracy of retrospective confidence judgments in general knowledge and reported that perceived expertise in a domain, not item-specific knowledge, was used as the basis of these judgments.
The role of expertise in confidence judgments has also been discussed within the eyewitness memory literature. Wells, Lindsay, and Ferguson (1979) focused on the role of confidence calibration through life experience. According to their account, confidence judgments in eyewitness memory are not accurate because people do not get feedback about the veracity of their eyewitness memories. A slightly modified version of this view was proposed in a study by Perfect, Watson, and Wagstaff (1993) , who showed that the within-subject confidence-accuracy relation in eyewitness memory was robust but that the between-subject confidence-accuracy relation was near zero. These authors argued that the lack of feedback and resultant lack of areas of expertise in eyewitness memory meant that participants were able to make item-to-item discriminations but could not predict their absolute level of performance. More recently, Perfect and Hollins (1996) argued that this lack of insight meant that witnesses were not accurate in making FOK judgments. This study directly contrasted FOK performance on a general knowledge test with performance on an eyewitness test and found robust within-subject recall-confidence relations for both types of test but accurate FOK judgments for only the general knowledge test. To our knowledge, this is the only test of FOK using eyewitness materials, and the main focus of the present article is to test the replicability of the finding of zero predictive validity for eyewitness FOK judgments.
We have already argued elsewhere that the lack of a reliable FOK judgment is consistent with the expertise-based familiarity heuristic because people lack knowledge of their level of expertise in eyewitness memory (Hollins & Perfect, 1997; Perfect & Hollins, 1996) . The use of the cuebased familiarity heuristic requires that the familiarity of the cue be a useful predictor of the ability to select the appropriate option in the recognition test. Although for general knowledge it is possible to see how this heuristic has use, it is less easy to see how this would apply to a single-trial episodic memory test like an eyewitness situation. In general knowledge, there are associative links between cue and target (e.g., between Australia and Canberra) that are bidirectional and relatively unique (there is only one country called Australia, and it has only one capital, Canberra, which, in turn, is capital of only one country). Therefore, finding the term Australia familiar would be informative with regard to the ability to identify the capital. However, for eyewitness memory, the-associative links are not constraining in this manner. Finding the concept car familiar would not lead to the subsequent identification of its license plate in a recognition test because each of us is familiar with many cars and many car license plates.
With regard to the trace-access heuristic, we have previously argued (Perfect & Hollins, 1996) that a zero FOK-recognition correlation was not consistent with Koriat's (1993 Koriat's ( , 1994 hypothesis that FOK accuracy came from the proportion of accurate related information retrieved in relation to incorrect partial information. Perfect and Hollins's argument was that there was no a priori reason to believe that partial information in eyewitness memory was less accurate than in general knowledge, if test difficulty was matched. However, we no longer are convinced by this argument. It is possible that the accuracy of partial information retrieved in general knowledge and eyewitness memory does not differ, but its use does. For example, when attempting to retrieve the answer to "What is the capital of Australia?," several pieces of information may come to mind, some of which may be useful in constraining the possible answers selected in the recognition test. However, the structure of an eyewitness event does not allow such soft constraints to operate so readily. For example, in attempting to retrieve the number on the license plate of a car, it does not help to remember the color of the car, the manufacturer, the model, or which direction it was going.
Thus, we believe that FOK judgments in eyewitness memory are likely to be, at best, weakly predictive, if not at chance. In contrast, we believe that confidence judgments for material that has been retrieved are likely to be relatively accurate. Our theoretical rationale for this expectation is that, at least in part, confidence judgments stem from the relative ease of generation of the retrieved items, a heuristic that may as easily be applied to eyewitness memory as general knowledge. There is already good evidence that such judgments are indeed accurate (Hollins & Perfect, 1997; Perfect & Hollins, 1996; Perfect et al., 1993) .
The one study that has thus far compared confidence judgments and FOK judgments in eyewitness memory demonstrated just this pattern (Perfect & Hollins, 1996) . It also showed that the pattern is different for a matched general knowledge test, completed by the same individuals at the same time; for general knowledge, the FOK-recognition relation was reliable, as was the confidence-accuracy relation. However, there are two issues that need careful consideration before any strong conclusions can be drawn regarding eyewitness FOK. One is the issue of level of performance and the other is the item variability. Performance in the recognition test in Perfect and Hollins (1996) was low (only 31% compared with chance 25%), so perhaps the FOK relation was weak because criterion test performance was at floor. This issue is examined in the present work.
The issue of variability is crucial when considering any correlational data. If there is little variability, then one cannot expect to find reliable correlations. Perhaps the unrecalled items for which FOK judgments are given form a relatively homogenous set of difficult items across which participants ratings are relatively unpredictive. A similar point was made recently by Kebbell, Wagstaff, and Covey (1997) with regard to confidence judgments. Nelson, Leonesio, Shimamura, Landwehr, and Narens (1982) demonstrated that for items that were adjacent in rank order of FOK, the gamma correlation was zero, but when items were taken from the top and bottom of an individuals FOK rank order, the gamma correlation was .77. Similarly, Schwartz and Metcalfe (1994) tested participants on two sets of general knowledge items that were matched for mean difficulty but differed in range of difficulty. They found that FOK accuracy was reliably higher for the set of items with the greater variability. Thus, variability can have a large impact.
In the experiments reported here, we set out to test the following predictions: Participants would show a robust confidence-accuracy relation for recalled items, participants would show a near chance relation between FOK and subsequent recognition, and this relation would not be due to level of difficulty nor variance across items. In each study, we showed participants a video and then tested their memories by means of cuedrecall test. If participants recalled the target fact, they rated their_confidence in their answer (pilot study and Experiment 1). If they could not recall the fact (or made a commission error in Experiment 3), they rated their confidence in their ability to recognize the answer at a later time (i.e., made an FOK rating). The veracity of the FOK rating was tested by means of a multiple-choice recognition test that followed after all judgments had been made. The accuracy of both metacognitive judgments was tested by means of the Goodman-Kruskal gamma correlation, as recommended by Nelson (1984) .
Pilot Study
Twenty-four participants viewed a brief video and were given a cued-recall test. Confidence ratings were collected for recalled items, and FOK judgments were collected for nonrecalled items. FOK accuracy was determined by means of a final four-alternative multiple-choice recognition test. The confidence-accuracy relation was robust for the recalled items (y = .52, SD = .35), but the relation between FOK and recognition was at chance (-y = -.08, SD = .89). Although this was in line with our prediction, interpretation of these data was compromised by the low level of recognition performance on the final test, which was not significantly above chance, f(19) = 0.89, p > .05. Because of this, we decided that the next experiment would use a longer delay and more test items.
Experiment 1

Method Participants
Forty-nine participants (21 men and 28 women) were recruited from posters placed around the Psychology Department at the University of Bristol. Their ages ranged from 18 to 64 years, with a mean age of 23 years. Each participant was paid £5 for participating in the experiment. One person failed to follow the instructions adequately and was therefore excluded from the analysis.
Materials
The eyewitnessed event consisted of three short films that reconstructed crime scenarios, which had been filmed by the local police Criminal Investigation Department (CID) training school. The films were made with a fixed perspective video camera, were filmed in real tune, and portrayed minor, nonviolent crimes, such as a robbery of a warehouse. Each scenario lasted between 40 and 120 s. The first two scenarios were those used in the pilot study, with a third scenario added at the end. The film was projected onto a large (120 cm X 120 cm) screen with a video projector. Thirty-eight questions were generated for the three scenarios, all of which were memory pointers (Koriat & Lieblich, 1977) , that is, they referred to a specific fact and did not involve estimates.
Procedure
The participants were tested in a small test room, either individually or in groups of up to 8. We asked participants to watch three short crime scenes and told them that they would be tested subsequently. Immediately after the crime scenarios had been presented, the participants took part in another experiment involving memory for names and places, which is not relevant to the present research. The first testing session took approximately 20 mins.
Testing took place after a delay of approximately 24 hr. We gave participants a questionnaire that asked for their age and gender and then asked participants a series of questions about each film (e.g., "What color was the car parked in the drive of the target house?"). For each item, participants were required to either give an answer and then rate their confidence in their answer, or if they were unable to provide an answer, to indicate how confident they were that they would be able to recognize the answer on a subsequent multiple-choice recognition test that would follow immediately. Both scales ranged from 1 to 5 (1 = absolutely sure, 2 = fairly sure, 3 = reasonably sure, 4 = not very sure, and 5 = not at all sure). Following completion of the first questionnaire, participants completed a multiple-choice recognition version of the same test, with four alternative answers for each question. On completion of the recall and recognition tests, participants were thanked, paid, and debriefed. This second session took approximately 20 min to complete.
Results and Discussion
On average, participants attempted to recall 25.70 (SD = 5.75) answers to the 38 items and gave valid FOK ratings on 11.50 (SD = 4.98) occasions. These do not sum to the number of items because some participants occasionally failed to give a rating or failed to attempt all questions in the recognition test. For recall attempts, the mean confidence expressed in answers was 2.32 (SD = 0.48), whereas for unrecalled items, the mean FOK was 3.96 (SD = 0.75). For recall, the proportion correct was 0.69 (SD = 0.11), which is significantly above chance, t(41) = 43.52, p < .001. Recognition accuracy for FOK items was lower (M = 0.34, SD = 0.33), but this was significantly above chance, ?(46) = 1.87, p < .05, one-tailed.
After we examined overall levels of performance (accuracy and confidence), we next examined the relation between the two. A withinsubjects analysis was carried out on the basis of the gamma correlation between participants' ratings and performance. For the recall-confidence relation, there was a reliable correlation (y = .65), f(47) = 17.32, p < .001, one-tailed. For the FOK-recognition relation, the mean gamma correlation was .08, which does not differ from zero, f(39) = 0.72, p > .05. Thus, this experiment replicated the pattern observed in the pilot study and in previous research (Perfect & Hollins, 1996) . In eyewitness event memory, there is clear evidence for a within-subject confidence-accuracy relation but no evidence of above chance accuracy for FOK judgments. However, the number of FOK responses was relatively low, as was recognition performance for these items. We therefore ran a second experiment that attempted to further increase the number of responses and the mean performance to determine whether the FOK gamma correlation would be raised.
Experiment 2
The robust within-subjects confidence-accuracy relation for recalled items that was found in the pilot study and Experiment 1 replicated previous findings (Hollins & Perfect, 1997; Perfect & Hollins, 1996; Perfect et al., 1993) , and, therefore, we decided that there was no need for further experiments to focus on this issue. However, because the number of FOK responses and recognition performance were both low in the previous studies, we felt that a further study that increased the number of FOK responses would be useful before drawing any strong conclusions. Rather than using a 24-hr delay in this experiment, we attempted to increase the rate of FOK responses by stressing that participants should not provide answers at recall that were guesses. The intention was to lower the number of recall attempts and thus increase the number of FOK responses on which to calculate the FOKrecognition correlation.
Method Participants
Thirty-three postgraduate and staff members of the University of Bristol were recruited to take part in the study. However, analysis of the data revealed that 6 participants had to be dropped from the analysis because they only used 1 point on the rating scale, and, hence, no FOKrecognition relation could be calculated. Two other participants failed to get any recognition items correct for which they had given an FOK rating, and they, too, were dropped from the analysis. The remaining 25 participants were between 20 and 44 years of age, with an average age of 26 years.
Materials
Two short video scenarios were used. These were different scenes from those used before, but as in Experiment 1, both depicted nonviolent crimes and were filmed from a fixed perspective. The films were projected onto a large screen at presentation, as in Experiment 1.
Procedure
Testing was identical to Experiment 1, except for the following differences. Testing took place on a single day, with a filled delay of 15 min between presentation and test, during which participants took part in an experiment concerning memory for cities in America. This experiment is not relevant here and is not discussed further. At test, 31 questions were asked, with participants being instructed to either write in their answer or provide an FOK judgment to each question. We strongly encouraged them not to guess an answer at recall through verbal instructions and printed instruction on top of the response sheet.
Results and Discussion
On average, participants attempted to recall 17.70 (SD = 5.70) answers to the cued-recall questions. The mean proportion correct was .62 (SD = .14). However, because the focus in this experiment was on the FOK judgments, we do not discuss performance on the recall test further.
The instructions were successful in increasing the number of valid FOK responses: An average of 14.60 (SD = 5.90) FOK responses were made by each participant, of which 5.07 (SD = 3.10) were correct on average. The mean FOK was 4.04 (SD = 0.58), and the mean proportion correct was .35 (SD = .12), a figure that is low but, nonetheless, significantly above chance, t(24) = 4.17, p < .001. Thus, although we were successful in raising the total number of FOK responses, this did not increase recognition accuracy.
The relation between FOK judgment and recognition performance was calculated with a gamma correlation, as before. The results are consistent with the first two experiments: The mean gamma correlation was .10, which is not significantly different from zero, t(24) = l.02,p > .05.
Further Analysis of FOK Accuracy in Experiments 1 and 2
Test Difficulty
Because recognition performance on FOK items was only just above chance in Experiments 1 and 2, we decided to examine more closely the relation between FOK accuracy and performance on the recognition test. Quite clearly, if performance is at or around chance, one may not expect that ratings would predict performance. To examine the role of level of recognition performance, we conducted two analyses: We examined the correlation between performance and FOK accuracy, and we also examined the mean level of FOK accuracy after removing the lowest performing participants. We conducted these analyses individually for each experiment and then for the experiments combined. The results were the same; therefore, we report only the combined data here. We prefer to present the combined data because removing low-scoring individuals from the analysis necessarily lowers the power of the statistical tests for the individual experiments.
The correlational analysis clearly revealed that there was no association between level of performance on the recognition test and a participant's gamma correlation, r(67) = .13, p > .05. The second analysis systematically removed the lowest scoring participants from the analysis to determine whether the remaining higher scoring participants demonstrated greater FOK accuracy. As Table 1 shows, this was not the case. Although the average gamma correlation across the two experiments for all participants was .09, this was not reliably improved by removal of the poorer performing participants. This lack of a reliable effect did not appear to be driven by level of performance on the recognition test and stood in marked contrast to the within-subject confidenceaccuracy relations observed for recalled items in the pilot study and Experiment 1 (y = 0.51 and -y = 0.71, respectively), which themselves were similar to those we have reported elsewhere (Perfect & Hollins, 1996; Perfect et al., 1993) .
As a final check, we also reanalyzed the confidence data from Experiment 1. First, we examined the correlation between performance and gamma and, as with the recognition test, found no relation, r(48) = .24, p > .05. Thus, those who recalled most accurately did not show the best gamma correlation. We also systematically removed the best participants on the recall test and examined the confidence-accuracy relation for those who remained to see if the high confidence-accuracy relation for recall was reduced as recall performance dropped. The data are reported in the bottom section of clear that systematically removing the better performing participants did not reduce the gamma correlation in any major way. Reducing recall performance from an average of 69% to an average of 58% reduced gamma correlations only from .65 to .60. Thus, the superior confidenceaccuracy relation in cued recall did not appear to be closely linked to performance on that task.
Range Effects
In addition to the two tests differing in mean level of performance, a second possibility is that the items involved in recall-confidence and FOKrecognition differ in variability. It is entirely possible that the unrecalled items were a more homogenous set than the recalled items, and, thus, a smaller judgment-accuracy relation would necessarily result for these items. Such range effects have been demonstrated in the literature (Nelson et al., 1982; Schwartz & Metcalfe, 1994) .
We examined this issue in four ways: (a) We examined whether the recalled items were more heterogenous than the nonrecalled items in terms of the ratings they received, (b) we examined whether variance in ratings predicted the gamma correlation for recalled and nonrecalled items, (c) we matched the recall items and the recognition items for homogeneity of the ratings and examined the effect on gamma, and (d) we examined whether the gamma correlations for FOK and confidence were significantly improved by calculating gamma across extreme judgments of confidence (high vs. low) rather than across all items.
If FOK accuracy was low because of restricted range, we expected to find that FOK judgments were less widespread across the confidence categories, that variance in ratings was associated with the magnitude of the gamma correlations, that matching for heterogeneity would match gammas, and that calculating gamma across the extreme ends of the scale would increase the FOK gamma more than the confidence gamma.
To estimate whether recalled or nonrecalled items were more heterogenous, we calculated the variance in the ratings each kind of item received on an individual basis and then calculated the ratio of variances for each participant in Experiment 1. We were able to do this for 45 participants. We tested these variance ratios using an F test for each participant, testing the one-tailed hypothesis that the recalled items are more heterogenous than the unrecalled ones. Overall, 34 participants showed higher variance for the ratings for recalled items, although only 17 comparisons were significant, with 28 being nonsignificant. Thus, there was some weak evidence for greater variance for recalled items. Is this important in driving the level of the gamma correlation? To examine this, we correlated variance in ratings with the gamma correlation for recalled and nonrecalled items separately. Variance did not appear to be related to the gamma correlation observed. For recalled items, the correlation was, r(48) = .01, and for unrecalled items, it was, r(42) = -.08. Thus, those participants with greater variance in their ratings did not appear to show greater accuracy in their metacognitive judgments. It appears that this factor is unlikely to explain the difference between the metacognitive judgments.
Nonetheless, we further tested the idea in two ways. First, we matched the two measures on variance in ratings by collapsing across several response bins. The proportion of responses across the rating scales was skewed, with the majority of responses for recall in the highest confidence category and the majority of the FOK judgments at the lower end of the scale. This is to be expected because participants are only likely to give a recall response if they are reasonably confident, and the FOK items are likely to include a set of items that participants feel they know nothing about at all. To overcome this asymmetry, we collapsed the responses into three categories-low, medium, and high-separately for FOK and confidence, giving as close as possible equivalent frequency counts in each response bin. For FOK, this meant that Ratings 1-3 were collapsed to form high FOK, Rating 4 was medium FOK, and Rating 5 was low FOK. For confidence, Rating 1 was high confidence, Rating 2 was designated medium confidence, and Ratings 3-5 were collapsed to form low confidence.
For the confidence ratings, the data from Experiment 1 were used, and 47 participants met the criterion of at least one response in the high, medium, and low categories. For FOK, this process of collapsing was conducted for the combined data from Experiments 1 and 2. The resultant data are shown in Table 2 , and it is clear that the matching process was successful. The confidence and FOK figures for the highest rating were 38% and 36%, respectively; for medium ratings, they were 24% and 22%, respectively; and for low confidence, they were 46% and 41%, respectively. A chi-squared analysis indicated that there was no difference between the two tests in frequency of usage across the rating scales, X 2 (5, N = 6) = 0.32, p > .05. However, the resultant gamma correlations were close to the values obtained using the full range of the scale reported in Table 1 . The confidence gamma increased from .65 to .72, whereas the equivalent gamma values for FOK were .09 and .12. Thus, we are confident that the collapsing process did not materially alter the gamma correlations and, therefore, variability did not impact the difference in gamma correlations between confidence and FOK. Note. FOK = feeling-of-knowing; All = gamma correlation calculated across all response bins; Extreme = gamma correlation calculated for high-and low-confidence response bins only.
Finally, we examined whether calculating the judgment-accuracy relation across more extreme responses had a greater effect on FOK accuracy than confidence judgment accuracy. The answer was no, even despite the fact that the gammas for confidence were already near ceiling. The results of recalculating the gamma correlations with only the high and low ratings is shown in the final column of Table 2 . As can be seen, there was an increase in the estimate of gamma for both FOK and confidence, but it was the latter that showed the most improvement.
Thus, although there was some evidence that there might have been more variance in the recalled items than in the nonrecalled items, this did not appear to explain the difference in gamma correlations between recalled and nonrecalled items. Variance in ratings did not predict gamma correlations on an individual basis, matching for variance in ratings did not remove the difference between the two kinds of metacognitive judgment, and increasing variance by examination of extreme responses only did not differentially increase gamma for FOK judgments.
Clearly, it is problematic to conclude that the null hypothesis has been supported. Although we have attempted to rule out explanations of the lack of accuracy for FOK judgments in eyewitness memory on the basis of range and difficulty, there may be other artifactual explanations. One possibility is that the test format of the recogni-tion test is inappropriate. Thus far, participants have made judgments about visual material but have been tested using written materials. It is conceivable that their predictions of performance would have more validity if the test format were also in a pictorial format. It is also arguable that prediction of recognition of visual material is of greater ecological interest in eyewitness memory. For example, a witness who fails to recall the model of a car used in a getaway is most likely to be shown pictures of models in any recognition test. For these reasons, we performed a third experiment, in which the final recognition test was in pictorial format. Because we were already testing older and younger adults as part of an ongoing research program on eyewitness memory, we were able to test two groups of participants.
Experiment 3
Method
Participants
Group 1: Older adults. Thirty-one volunteers from the Psychology Department's older adult panel acted as participants. One participant was color-blind and could not complete the test, and another participant failed to complete the response sheet correctly. Both were dropped from the analyses. The remaining 29 participants had a mean age of 72 years, with an age range of 62-81 years.
Group 2: Younger adults. Thirty-three volunteers were recruited with posters placed in the Psychology Department. The participants had an age range of 18-36 years, with a mean age of 22 years.
Materials
A brief videotaped scenario was presented with the same video-projection system we used before. The scenario depicted a theft from an office and lasted just over 2 min. Seventeen test items were developed for this video, and for each item, there was a three-choice visual recognition test, with photographs (15 cm X 10 cm) of the target and two distractors against a plain background. The visual distractors were chosen to be plausible alternatives from the same semantic category (e.g., different types of jeans and t-shirts worn by the actors, different brands of cigarettes and soft drinks seen during the video, and so forth).
Procedure
Participants were tested either individually or in pairs in a single session. At the start of the session, we told participants that they would see a short crime video and that they should pay as much attention to it as possible because they would be tested later. No details were given concerning the nature of this test. A filled delay of approximately 15 min then followed, during which participants took part in an unrelated experimental study.
The test procedure for the cued recall was the same as in the previous experiments, with the following modifications. At the cued-recall test, participants made FOK judgments for all items rather than just those they had not recalled. This allowed us to examine FOK accuracy for commission as well as omission errors (cf. Krinsky & Nelson, 1985) . The second change was that the final recognition test was given visually. We presented participants with the written question they had attempted previously, together with three photographs labeled A, B, and C. We told participants to circle the appropriate response on their response sheet, guessing where necessary.
There was one difference between the methods of testing for the two groups. The younger group was tested after the older group's data had been collected, and it was clear that without suitable modification, the younger group would not produce sufficient FOK responses. To reduce the possibility of floor effects in omission errors (and hence omission FOK judgments, which are the main focus of this article), we discouraged guessing by printing "DO NOT GUESS" next to every question rather than merely at the top of the instruction sheet. Because we did not intend to compare the two age groups, this was not considered a problem.
Results and Discussion
On average, the older participants correctly recalled the answer on 6.37 (SD = 1.97) occasions, recalled incorrectly on 4.44 (SD = 2.03) occasions, and failed to attempt recall on 6.10 (SD = 2.68) occasions. The mean FOK rating overall (collapsed across error type) was 3.54 (SD = 0.53), whereas for commission errors, it was 2.49 (SD = 0.80), and for omission errors, it was 4.31 (SD = 0.66). The recognition accuracy scores for the FOK items were significantly above chance but, once again, quite low: Overall (collapsed across error type) mean proportion correct was .44 (SD = .13), f(28) = 4.52, p < .001, one-tailed, whereas for commission errors, it was .48 (SD = .22), t(21) = 3.46, p < .01, one-tailed, and for omission errors, it was .40 (SD -.18), f(28) = 2.08, p < .05, one-tailed.
The younger adults showed a higher level of performance in general. They correctly recalled the answer on 8.21 (SD = 0.41) occasions and provided an incorrect answer on 1.24 (SD -0.22) occasions. Thus, our repeated instruction not to guess appears to have had the desired effect. The mean FOK rating overall (collapsed across error type) was 3.25 (SD = 0.67), whereas for commission errors, it was 1.66 (SD -0.76), and for omission errors, it was 3.56 (SD = 0.76). Recognition performance for the FOK items was well above chance. Overall (collapsed across error type) mean proportion correct was 0.62 (SD = 0.18), f(32) = 9.26, .p < .001, one-tailed, whereas for commission errors, it was 0.67 (SD = 0.39), f(19) = 3.90, p < .001, one-tailed, and for omission errors, it was 0.61 (SD = 0.20), f(32) = 8.04, p < .001, one-tailed.
The critical question for this experiment was whether the use of a visual recognition test format made the FOK-recognition relation reliable. For the older group, examination of omission and commission errors separately was problematic because only 17 participants produced data that would allow calculation of a gamma correlation for omission errors and only 11 for commission errors. For commission errors, the mean gamma correlation was .31 (SD = .90), which was not significantly above chance, f (16) = 1.42, p > .05. For omissions, the mean gamma correlation was negative (-y --.09 and SD = .97), and therefore could not be significantly above chance. Collapsing across omission and commission errors meant that gamma correlations could be calculated for all 29 participants. The mean gamma correlation was. 18 (SD = .71), which was not significantly above chance, ?(28) = 1.37, p > .05. For the younger group, meaningful analysis of gamma correlation for commission errors was impossible because only 1 participant produced data for which a gamma correlation could be computed. However, 22 participants produced data that allowed a gamma correlation to be calculated for omission errors. The mean gamma was .06 (SD = .76), which was not significantly above chance. Collapsing across omission and commission errors meant that gamma could be calculated for 27 participants and produced a mean value of .06 (SD = .74), which, once again, was not above chance. Thus, this group, who performed markedly higher on the criterion test did not exceed the level of gamma observed in the older adults, nor did they exceed the younger adults in the previous studies who had performed poorly on the criterion tests.
To further explore whether the low level of gamma correlations was due to performance on the criterion test, we conducted a meta-analysis as before, combining the two groups. This enabled us to examine the correlation between criterion test performance and gamma and to exclude the poorer performing participants hi order to examine the gamma correlation as mean recognition performance increased. The overall correlation between gamma and recognition was nonsignificant, r(56) = -.18, replicating the finding reported earlier. The change in mean gamma correlations for omission errors, commission errors, and all errors as performance increased are shown in Table 3 .
The data in Table 3 also replicated those reported above. Systematically removing participants who performed poorly did not increase the mean gamma correlation. This was true for omission errors, as in the previous studies, but also for commission errors (although the numbers of participants was low) and for both error types combined. Because the overall level of recognition was considerably higher in this study, this is reassuring. The pattern across the experiments was that the eyewitness FOK gamma correlation remained at chance whatever the level of performance, and this was also the pattern within each meta-analysis. It appears that the use of visual recognition materials did not alter the conclusion that eyewitness FOK lacks predictive accuracy. Note. None of the gamma correlations were significantly above chance. Gamma correlations in bold are negative. Rg performance on the criterion recognition test.
General Discussion
With regard to confidence judgments, the pilot study and Experiment 1 replicated the pattern of findings reported elsewhere. There is now solid evidence that eyewitnesses can discriminate between their recall attempts (Hollins & Perfect, 1997; Perfect & Hollins, 1996; Perfect et al., 1993) . Our explanation for this robust relationship is that participants can use retrieval-based heuristics to distinguish between answers. Items that come to mind quickly or vividly with lots of associated information or with other corroborating details will be associated with high confidence. Conversely, those items that come to mind only after lots of effort and with little imagery or with few associated information or corroborating details will be associated with low confidence. It is easy to see how the use of such heuristics is liable to produce a robust confidence-accuracy relation across items. We also believe that the use of at least some of these heuristics is likely to be as informative for eyewitness memory as for general knowledge, and, hence, in the studies reported above, there is no difference between the confidence-accuracy relations for recalled information in general knowledge and eyewitness memory.
The findings for the FOK judgments stand in marked contrast, and the remainder of the discussion focuses on these data. In all three experiments reported here, FOK accuracy was at chance. These three demonstrations replicated the pattern reported earlier by Perfect and Hollins (1996) ; thus, there are now four studies demonstrating this pattern. What is the cause of such poor performance?
One hypothesis may be that the test format is crucial. The confidence-accuracy relation is calculated for a recall test, whereas the FOK judgments are assessed by means of a multiple-choice recognition test. However, previous work suggests that this is not the crucial difference. Perfect et al. (1993) reported robust within-subject confidence-accuracy correlations using a four-alternative multiple-choice recognition test. Hollins and Perfect (1997) directly compared individuals' ability to judge the accuracy of their memories using recall and multiple-choice recognition and found no differences between the withinsubjects confidence-accuracy relation for recall and recognition.
An obvious factor to consider when comparing the confidence-accuracy gamma for recall with the FOK-recognition gamma is item difficulty. After all, by definition, the recall confidence judgments are made on the items that the participants find easiest. However, we do not believe that this explains our data for a number of reasons. We were successful in raising recognition performance from just above chance levels in Experiment 1 to well above chance levels for the younger adults in Experiment 3, but the gamma correlations remained at chance. When we correlated FOK accuracy with recognition, there was a zero correlation between them. When we omitted the poorest performing participants from the analysis, to ensure that mean performance rose to well above chance, this had no effect on the estimate of gamma for FOK. In Experiment 3, dropping the poorest performing participants in the recognition test resulted in a mean performance level of 69%, with an associated nonsignificant gamma correlation of .17. By coincidence, recall accuracy for Experiments 1 and 2 combined was also 69%, but this was associated with a highly reliable gamma correlation of .65.
In any case, it can be argued that the testdifficulty issue is a specious argument. We were interested in whether eyewitnesses could make accurate FOK judgments for unrecalled material. To argue that the unrecalled items are the difficult ones is to miss the point. In the domain of general knowledge, it is well established that predictions of recognition in the absence of recall are accurate (see Nelson, 1988 , for a review). Furthermore, the theoretical accounts of FOK accuracy were developed precisely to explain how people are able to make predictive judgments of recognition performance for items they cannot recall. To argue that FOK judgments for eyewitness memory are inaccurate because the items are difficult and could not be recalled seems misguided, given that these are the circumstances under which FOK judgments are normally made with predictive power in the domain of general knowledge. Perfect and Hollins (1996) demonstrated just this point. With tests that were matched in difficulty, they found that a general knowledge test produced an FOK-recognition correlation of y = .37, which was reliable, whereas for eyewitness memory, the equivalent figure was nonsignificant, y = .10.
In our reanalysis of the data from Experiments 1 and 2, we also examined the hypothesis that there was less variability in response strength for items given an FOK rating than for those for which a recall attempt was made. There was some support for this idea, but this did not appear to explain the difference between the gammas for recall confidence and FOK. Variance in ratings did not predict gamma for each measure individually, matching the measures on variability did not alter the pattern, and increasing the variance by examining only extreme judgments did not differentially increase the gamma for FOK judgments.
With regard to the items on which an FOK judgment was made, our first two studies examined omission errors only and ignored commission errors. However, in Experiment 3, we did include commission errors, and our conclusions did not alter. Thus, the type of items did not seem to be a crucial factor in the present studies.
Another procedural concern is whether we should have collected FOK responses for all items, as in some recent FOK studies (e.g., Reder & Ritter, 1992) , rather than just the subset of nonrecalled items. Because Reder and Ritter's methodology required speeded responses to all items prior to a retrieval attempt, it is not a methodology with obvious forensic relevance; therefore, we did not adopt that paradigm here. However, it could be the case that FOK judgments would be more accurate if a wider range of items had been included (cf. Schwartz and Metcalfe, 1994) . However, there are a number of reasons for not measuring predictive FOK judgments for all items. Foremost, we were motivated to study the accuracy of FOK judgments in the absence of recall, as in the classic Hart (1965) paradigm, because we believe this has forensic relevance. A second problem is that without using rapid responding (which has limited forensic relevance), one cannot be sure that a participant has not already generated an answer and is thus making a retrospective judgment even when a predictive judgment has been requested. Thus, with such a paradigm, it is very hard to unconfound the range of items (all items vs. those unrecalled) with metacognitive decision (predictive judgment vs. retrospective judgment). Because we were attempting to distinguish between the two kinds of decision, it made the most sense to use the standard Hart (1965) paradigm and focus primarily on recall omissions.
However, there is already data that has contrasted predictive and postdictive judgments for all items, using a recognition test. Perfect et al. (1993) showed witnesses a video and then asked for predictive confidence judgments for all items. This was followed by a recognition test, accompanied by retrospective confidence judgments for all items. The gamma for the predictive judgments was .24, whereas for retrospective judgments, it was significantly higher at .49. Thus, even when the range of items was matched, retrospective judgments of confidence had greater validity than predictive judgments. Comparing the predictive gamma for the Perfect et al. study with the present FOK predictions may be con-strued as evidence in favor of range effects. However, because range cannot explain the predictive versus postdictive difference in that study and did not appear to explain the confidence FOK difference in the present studies, we argue that the higher level of predictive accuracy in Perfect et al. stems from the fact that some of the participants' predictive judgments were retrospective.
Thus, in conclusion, we believe that eyewitnesses's predictions of recognition in the absence of recall are likely to be consistently poor. We do not believe it is due to item difficulty or variability artifacts. We argue that the lack of FOK accuracy in eyewitness memory stems from the use of heuristics to judge FOK that are informative in the domain of general knowledge but lack use in the domain of eyewitness memory. The reason that they lack use is that eyewitness events lack the interconnectedness and structure of general knowledge. As a result, heuristics that rely on expertise, cue-target associations, or partial information-target associations, as proposed by the main theoretical accounts of FOK in the cognitive domain, are doomed to fail.
An obvious issue is how we reconcile these claims with the previous studies in the literature that demonstrated above chance FOK accuracy in episodic memory tasks. For example, Hart (1967) showed that positive FOK ratings led to better subsequent memory for consonant trigrams than negative FOK ratings, Blake (1973) also showed that FOK judgments were predictive of recognition of trigrams, Nelson et al. (1982) showed that FOK judgments were predictive of word recognition to a number cue, and Schacter (1983) showed above chance FOK in a standard wordassociation task.
Why are these different to an eyewitness task? It is hard to be definitive, but consideration of the experimental materials used in these studies allows a number of speculations to be made. Both Hart (1967) and Blake (1973) used a paradigm that confounded FOK with partial recall, and, hence, retrieval-based heuristics. They used a partial report technique in which FOK judgments were made for all trigrams that were not completely correct. Thus, it is possible that FOK in these studies was based partially on retrospective confidence for what had already been recalled. Unfortunately, they do not address this point with their data, although Blake's second experiment was consistent with this idea because when the distractors all contained the information that participants had already recalled, FOK accuracy dropped markedly. The implication of this work is that when no information is recalled initially, FOK accuracy is most likely to be low. This was the situation in the paradigm we used in the present studies. Nelson et al. (1982) were the only ones to report a gamma correlation between FOK and recognition. They examined predictions for items that were learned to criterion once, twice, or four times. Although their overall gamma correlation was significant, the mean value was only .17, which is in line with the present work. In fact, the only group to show above chance performance was the group who overlearned the most. The gamma correlation for the material learned to criterion once showed the lowest level of gamma CY = -.02). Schacter (1983) examined FOK accuracy across a number of manipulations, each using a word pair paradigm. Experiment 1 used word pairs that were weakly to moderately associated, with a 5-s exposure and tested cued recall either immediately or after a 1-week delay. FOK accuracy was above chance for both delays. In Experiment 2, exposure duration was manipulated, as was the retrieval cue at test. The retrieval cue was either the intralist cue, which was the weakly associated word seen at encoding, or an extralist cue, which was a strong associate of the target. FOK accuracy was independent of encoding conditions but was only reliable with intralist cues. In Experiment 3, participants were presented with word pairs that were either phonologically or semantically related. At test, they were cued with either the same cue or an alternate, phonologically or semantically related cue. FOK accuracy was only above chance when the identical cue was used. Thus, across the studies, the FOK judgments were only reliable when identical cues were used at encoding and test. It is hard to see how this applies to a real-world situation where what is encoded is unknown and where the test cue is a specific question from an interrogator.
To summarize, our aim in the present research project was to answer a simple question. If an eyewitness fails to recall a fact during an investigation, are they able to accurately predict their subsequent recognition for that fact? The answer seems to be no. Clearly, further research is required to determine whether eyewitness FOK always lacks predictive power. Our studies used the standard recall-judgment-recognition paradigm pioneered by Hart (1965) . However, other paradigms have been used, and it may be the case that our findings do not generalize. For example, Schwartz and Metcalfe (1994) showed that use of recall as a criterion test produces higher estimates of FOK accuracy than recognition, and this is one potential extension to the present research. Another issue that is worthy of further exploration is face identification tasks. We used event memory because it is possible to get verbal descriptions of scenes and events. Although recall of a face is harder to quantify, it may be possible to study the predictive accuracy of lineup performance in witnesses who claim not to recall details of an individual (e.g., hair style and color) but who believe they would be able to recognize the individual. Nonetheless, although we acknowledge the need for further research, we do feel able to answer the question we posed in our initial scenario. Asking a witness whether he or she is likely to recognize the color of a getaway car that he or she cannot presently recall is unlikely to produce useful information for the investigative process.
